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 Words Fail Me. (Stanley Cavell’s 
Life out of Music) 
 WILLIAM DAY 
 Stanley Cavell isn’t the first to arrive at philosophy through a life 
with music. Nor is he the fi rst whose philosophical practice bears the marks 
of that life. Jean- Jacques Rousseau “testifi es to the harmony between his 
musical work and his philosophy in his  Dialogues. ”  1  Friedrich Nietzsche 
saw himself as “the most musical of all philosophers”— presumably more 
than even his musico- philosophical mentor Schopenhauer— and asserts 
in all seriousness that “without music, life would be an error.”  2  Ludwig 
Wittgenstein tells his friend Maurice Drury, “It is impossible for me to say 
in my book one word about all that music has meant in my life. How then 
can I hope to be understood?”  3  (That these are all philosophers Cavell wrote 
about and cared about shouldn’t go unnoticed.) I can’t recall when exactly 
Stanley told me that a highlight of his high school years was playing lead 
alto in an otherwise all- black jazz band; or when I heard the story of his 
performing at Berkeley in the premiere of an opera by Roger Sessions during 
which the English horn player had some mishap and Stanley, seated next 
to him playing clarinet, transposed and played the English horn solo on 
the spot; or when he confessed to me late in his teaching career, after the 
fi rst iteration of his opera course, his nearly unbearable, silent anxiety or 
fear (somehow traceable to his mother’s perfect pitch) that in humming or 
singing an excerpt from an aria in class he might be reproducing the melody 
in the wrong key.  4  
 Much of Cavell’s life with music is confi rmed for the world in his 
philosophical autobiography  Little Did I Know . The place of that life for 
Cavell is best captured, to my ear, in the anecdote of what he calls his “impotent 
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gallantry.” On leaving a New Year’s Eve party in Greenwich Village as 1948 
became 1949, he offered to escort an African American singer- friend to her 
apartment up in Harlem. Recalling her unease and eventual admonishment 
as they walked together north of 125th Street— “Don’t you see that you 
are in far greater danger here than I am? Please go back”— Cavell writes, in 
partial echo of Wittgenstein’s despairing remark to Drury: “It had evidently 
never occurred to me that a black person would not know by looking at me 
what my life with music had been and therewith comprehend that that life 
of mine exempted me from participation in the tragedy of racial injustice.”  5  
It’s possible to read the autobiographer here as admonishing his younger 
and naive Juilliard- student self. (The autobiographer calls his book, after all, 
 Little Did I Know. ) But on what account? Naivete isn’t a philosophical error. 
Self- ignorance, however, is. What strikes the older Stanley in this memory, 
I think it’s clear, is the younger Stanley’s youthful failure to recognize that 
this crucial aspect of his identity doesn’t show itself with every step and 
breath he takes. It is a gentle, convivial admonishment, the kind that a 
musico- philosophical mentor might give, smilingly, to a student he or she 
is fond of. 
 The numerous scattered anecdotes of Cavell’s early musical career in 
 Little Did I Know are capped off by an entry (“April 10, 2004”) describing 
his eventual realization that he was to leave that career behind— for what 
exactly, he did not yet know. As his description makes clear, it would take 
the better part of a lifetime for the leaving to arrive at an end: 
 Yet this laborious path to nowhere had, I laboriously came to understand, 
been essential for me. Music had my whole life been so essentially a part 
of my days, of what in them I knew was valuable to me, was mine to do, 
that to forgo it proved to be as mysterious a process of disentanglement 
as it was to have been awarded it and have nurtured it, eliciting a process 
of undoing I will come to understand in connection with the work of 
mourning.  6  
 Readers of Cavell may well be surprised by the implication that the concept 
of mourning, a master tone of Cavell’s writing from his reading of Thoreau’s 
 Walden through his essays on Coleridge and Wordsworth and Emerson’s 
“Experience,” should have as one of its originary sites the memory- shock of 
his leaving his musical life behind.  7  There is no mention of mourning, notably, 
in Cavell’s description of his family’s move, just before he turned seven, 
from the south side of Atlanta to its north side— an event often highlighted 
(including by me) in discussions of  Little Did I Know .  8  But mourning will 
become for Cavell an emblem of the perfectionist work of philosophy itself, 
which “has to do with the perplexed capacity to mourn the passing of the 
world.”  9  If the emblem of that emblem for Cavell is the abandonment or 
transformation of his life with music for a life of philosophy, a life dedicated 
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to “the repetitive disinvestment of what has passed,”  10  then Cavell’s life with 
music and thoughts about the nature of music ought to be revelatory of 
Cavell’s philosophical life and thoughts. 
 Is that promising too much? It can seem to overlook the simple, undeniable 
truth that Cavell’s musical performance and improvisational and compositional 
abilities were after all, pretty completely, when all is said and done,  abandoned . 
It is also true that the singular musical experience Cavell writes about most 
often— his composing, while at Berkeley, the incidental music for a student 
production of  King Lear — had its greatest impact on him, as he discovered 
“not without considerable anxiety,”  11  for the thoughts it engendered about 
Shakespeare’s play rather than for the music it drew out of him. But then 
unsurprisingly, as Cavell acknowledges, what leads him into  Lear’s world is 
exactly his writing and rehearsing and conducting this music “in response to the 
play.” My concern, in any event, isn’t to resuscitate Cavell the musician (though 
some amateur recordings of him at the piano improvising on popular songs 
near the end of his life are, I found on the distracted occasions of my hearing 
them, intriguing). It is to become even more familiar with the philosopher 
Cavell that our interest in Cavell the musician matters. 
 The thought I want to follow in these remarks is that Cavell’s distinctive 
orientation in philosophy— call this his lifelong coming to terms with his 
abandoning a life in music— is guided in part by an interest in those moments 
in experience where words seem to run out, or veer toward nonsense, leaving 
in their wake touchstones of ecstasy. 
 I was introduced to the name “Stanley Cavell” by a musician. John 
Harbison, the American composer and a long- time friend of Cavell since 
their meeting in Princeton in 1962, was in the summer of 1981 composer- in- 
residence at the music festival in Santa Fe, where I was an undergraduate at 
St. John’s College. We met up at one point to talk about music and philosophy 
(I was making plans, despite or because of St. John’s classical curriculum, 
to write a senior essay on jazz improvisation), and I asked Harbison if he 
could recommend any contemporary writing on the philosophy of music. 
That’s how I  fi rst came to know Cavell’s writing voice, a voice I  would 
soon enough learn was indistinguishable from his speaking voice, through 
the pair of essays Harbison directed me to, “Music Discomposed” and “A 
Matter of Meaning It.”  12  
 Seven- and- a- half years later, on leave from my graduate studies at 
Columbia to spend a year at Harvard,  13  I  asked Stanley about musical 
ineffability. More specifi cally, I  asked whether passages from “Music 
Discomposed” like the following— passages that picture the scene of 
exasperation in our trying to explain to someone what we value in some 
music or other— are depictions of the unsayable: 
 One is anxious to communicate the experience of such objects. … 
I  want to tell you  something I’ve seen, or heard, or realized, or come 
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to understand, for the reasons for which  such things are communicated 
(because it is news, about a world we share, or could). Only I fi nd that 
I can’t  tell you; and that makes it all the more urgent to tell you. I want 
to tell you because the knowledge, unshared, is a burden— not, perhaps, 
the way having a secret can be a burden, or being misunderstood; a little 
more like the way, perhaps, not being believed is a burden, or not being 
trusted. … It matters, there is a burden, because unless I can tell what 
I know, there is a suggestion (and to myself as well) that I do  not know. 
But I  do — what I see [or hear] is  that (pointing to the object). But for that 
to communicate, you have to see [or hear] it too.  14  
 I remember asking Stanley my question with some urgency, since I  had 
pressed the same question, possibly only days earlier, over lunch with Jim 
Conant— Jim was about to make his philosophical reputation disabusing 
readers of the  Tractatus who mistakenly fi nd in it a “hidden teaching” that 
is “inherently inexpressible”  15  — and he had all but persuaded me that the 
category of the unsayable was a null set. 
 Stanley was, I’ll say, less resolute than Jim in rejecting my suggestion. 
Still, my reading was off, and in responding to it he offered what I wanted, 
a rare and detailed gloss on his fi rst essay on music. Stanley’s response— I 
wrote down the gist of it at the time— carried two lines of thought:
 1.  He said that part of what he was thinking when he wrote that 
passage was how the imperative “You have to  hear it” can discount 
another’s claim to have described what is going on in a piece, even 
if the other person mouths the same words you would use to say 
what is going on in it. Cavell’s recalling this motive turned my focus 
to the following two excerpts from the same section of “Music 
Discomposed”: 
 What I know, when I’ve  seen or  heard something is, one may wish to 
say, not a matter of  merely knowing it…. Perhaps “merely knowing” 
should be compared with “not really knowing”: “You don’t really know 
what it’s like to be a Negro”; “You don’t really know how your remark 
made her feel”; “You don’t really know what I mean when I  say that 
Schnabel’s slow movements give the impression not of slowness but of 
infi nite length.” You merely say the words. 
 The paragraph goes on to discuss what place knowing  has in these 
contexts: 
 The issue in each case is: What would  express this knowledge? It is not 
that my knowledge will be real, or more than  mere knowledge, when 
I acquire a particular feeling, or come to see something. For the issue can 
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also be said to be: What would express the acquisition of that feeling, or 
show that you have seen the thing? And the answer might be that I now 
 know something I didn’t know before.  16  
 Knowing in these (moral and aesthetic) contexts doesn’t have the shape of 
a proposition to which is added the appropriate grounding or justifying 
experience; it has a quite different shape. Knowing here is more like cases of 
sudden recognition (“I know that face,” “I know that move”) that can change 
in a fl ash every element of one’s perception.  17  To express  this knowledge 
requires that one  give expression to those features or that gesture, to that 
sight or sound. In that light, this section of “Music Discomposed” is not so 
much about what cannot be said or expressed as about what we mean when 
we say that we know (or see or hear) a something of this sort. What “Music 
Discomposed”  does say about expressing this knowledge is contained in a 
single sentence: “Describing one’s experience of art is itself a form of art; the 
burden of describing it is like the burden of producing it.”  18  
 2. Stanley also pointed out, as his teacher J. L. Austin had done, that there 
is a perfectly trivial sense in which the smell of coffee or the sound of 
a clarinet,  19  say, can be put into words. (Just like that.)  20   — But those 
words, of course, standing by themselves, are hardly an expression of 
knowledge, at least of the kind of knowledge we are tempted to declare 
beyond words.  Expressing what we know— or showing it, Tractarian- 
wise— comes easier in some matters than in others. 
 And yet: Cavell recounts early in  Little Did I Know a peculiar gesture of 
his mother’s that seems to serve him as a touchstone for what one might 
well call music’s expressible- but- unsayable aspects— “the great secrets,” 
he writes, “I knew I craved to have” and that his musically gifted mother 
“seemed to divine.” The instance he reports occurred at a recital by the great 
violinist Fritz Kreisler, for which Stanley (aged ten or eleven) traveled with 
his mother to San Francisco from their home in Sacramento. At various 
moments during the recital, particularly at the ends of each of Kreisler’s 
encores, his mother would “suddenly produce (a gesture I knew well and 
would glory in when directed to something I had done) an all but inaudible 
high cry and silently snap the fi ngers of her hand nearer me and thrust it 
toward her face, which was turned as if to ward off a blow.”  21  (Is there an 
epistemology that gives us a complete account of this species of knowing, a 
knowing that is neither propositional nor a mere familiarity nor a knowing- 
how?) If you were to attempt to translate or reduce Stanley’s mother’s gesture 
to words— “It is obviously an expression of approval”; “It means, in effect, 
‘exactly right’ ”— you would thereby invite the response, “But you have to 
 hear it.” Part of what that command expresses, we will see, is an awareness 
that music- making is itself already a kind of saying (for those who have ears 
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to hear). The point is alluded to in Cavell’s description of what he took away 
from Kreisler’s playing that day: 
 There was a way he stood listening when the piano was playing a solo 
passage, especially I  suppose in a slow movement, his head and body 
absolutely still, which I retain as an image of total concentration, ending 
in a single unhurried gesture that brought the violin back beneath the 
chin and the bow back to the strings at the instant of the violin’s next 
entrance— as if music had been induced to utter itself.  22  
 I grant that the “as if” here (“as if music had been induced to utter itself”) 
matters, as the modifi er “a kind of” does in my description of music- making 
as “a kind of saying.” But just as the suggestion of a link between music and 
speech is an ancient and seemingly innocuous one, so is it neither fl ippant nor 
mere analogy, not peculiar to Kreisler’s somewhat singular and memorable 
preparation before an entrance. (I clarify or forge the link between music 
and speech that I associate with Cavell below.) 
 Words appear to run out at other moments and in other contexts. Twice 
in  Little Did I Know , having said all that seems fi tting about a particularly 
striking experience, Cavell is left sensing that not enough has been said 
to fully convince his reader, and he concludes by simply affi rming his 
conviction, but without any fear that he has thereby undermined it. I am 
struck by where these moments occur. Taken in tandem, they appear to link 
the mysteries of sexual awakening and musical ecstasy. The fi rst— in which, 
admittedly, the moment of wordless knowing is somewhat whimsical— 
concerns the unspoken connection that the not quite seven- year- old Stanley 
felt between himself and “a girl of crushing beauty” nearly twice his age 
who, like him, appeared in a children’s talent review in Indian dress, but not 
before appearing before him backstage undressed: 
 I think that is what I saw, although it took some time for me to understand 
that she had taken off really all of her clothes, upon which recognition 
I was propelled from the room by an invisible force of nature, something 
like a consuming wave of aromatic mist. … I tried once or twice during 
the ensuing week of two shows a day to interest this mythical being in the 
cosmic fact that we were both Indian royalty, by leaving my costume on 
and stationing myself by the stairs down to the men’s dressing room until 
she walked off the stage and had a chance to remark the closeness of our 
connection. Evidently I had failed to place myself in clear enough view 
for that. But I knew what I knew, and it was satisfactory.   23  
 The second occasion concerns the particular, polished, professional sound of 
the all- black (except for a guitarist and himself) rehearsal jazz band in which 
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the fi fteen- year- old Cavell played the lead alto saxophone, a band he claims 
could rival the sound of the best jazz bands of its day: 
 When he counted off the tempo for a downbeat the ensuing force of sound 
was so strong that I feared the house could not withstand it, and I was 
so thrilled by it that I felt I could barely continue playing. … Everything 
we played that morning … was an original composition of Wiley’s, not 
simply an arrangement; and the ideas were more advanced than any I had 
heard outside of the Ellington band.... I can readily imagine that someone 
will think my story remembering our sound in Wiley’s arrangements for 
his black band, as it were invoking comparison with the Basie band of 
that era, belongs on the side of the delusional. I  have to say that on 
somber refl ection I do not really or fully believe that. I place it among 
those experiences of my life about which I am moved to say: I know what 
I know.  24  
 Finding these passages in a philosophical autobiography called  Little Did 
I Know , the reader is all but required to consider how it is that “I know 
what I know” (“I knew what I knew”) says what it does, avoiding triviality. 
 We can grant that Cavell’s story of a secret connection to the Indian 
princess registers little more than a child’s impression, and that the majesty 
of Wiley’s band (absent recorded evidence) is no better than an impression. 
Given that, the absence of further words, while understandable, can seem 
protective, even dismissive of doubt, as if the book’s title meant, “Little did 
I know, but I knew  this .” But these invocations of “I know what I know” 
should be compared to a remark in Wittgenstein’s  Investigations to which 
Cavell often turns. In it, Wittgenstein gives voice to that moment in any 
explanation of my apparent certainties when my justifi cations appear 
exhausted: “Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’ ”  25  Cavell 
(reading Wittgenstein) interprets the one so inclined not as dismissing the 
questioner or voicing despair over the possibility of communication, but as 
holding that inclination in check, perhaps through an awareness of what 
our understanding each other, after all, rests on. Taking a cue from Cavell’s 
reading, I want to suggest that “I know what I know” in these passages is 
not intended by Cavell to silence doubters or to mark where words end. 
Rather, he employs these words to fl ag a memory, to draw our attention to 
it, and to acknowledge where a next question must lead— namely, further 
down the path of such incandescent experiences, with the aim of discovering 
how these “detours on the human path to death” might help Cavell “achieve 
my own death.”  26  In the wake of these recaptured memories, in other 
words, words do not come to an end out of necessity, as if in the presence of 
something ineffable. They simply stop, awaiting the impulse to more speech 
(whether from himself or, in reading, from his reader). 
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 But to return to music: What I take to be culminating thoughts on the burden 
borne by words and their failure appear in Cavell’s late essay on music, 
“Impressions of Revolution.”  27  There the sense of our failure to articulate— 
or more exactly, to conceptualize— what we hear in music draws inspiration 
from Walter Benjamin’s mid- 1920s work  The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama ( Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels ). In this study of German 
baroque tragedy ( Trauerspiel literally means “mourning- play”) Benjamin 
declares at one point that “the spoken word [as opposed to music on the one 
hand, and to written language on the other] is only affl icted by meaning, so 
to speak, as if by an inescapable disease” so that “meaning is encountered, 
and will continue to be encountered as the reason for mournfulness,” and 
that “the phonetic tension with speech in the language of the seventeenth 
century leads directly to music, the opposite of meaning- laden speech.”  28  
Cavell ties these remarks to his long- posited idea that what is known as 
philosophical skepticism is fueled by our alternating fear of and wish 
for inexpressiveness. He then offers this succinct summary of Benjamin’s 
claim and its resonance with his own:  “Music allows the achieving of 
understanding without meaning, that is to say, without the articulation of 
individual acts of reference on which intelligibility is classically thought to 
depend.”  29  I fi nd in this formulation or epigram a guide for clarifying not 
only Cavell's thinking about music but the place of musical experience in his 
thinking about the expressibility of words. 
 The picture of human understanding ungrounded in individual acts of 
reference is more than reminiscent of the picture of language that emerges 
from Wittgenstein’s  Investigations. In that picture, our ability to speak to 
one another, and to understand one another, does not rest in some fact 
of language or some fact about a world that our words attach to, as the 
philosophical tradition to which Wittgenstein is responding argues. Cavell 
notes elsewhere that the effort to apply the traditional picture to concepts 
of experience— Wittgenstein “remembers someone striking himself on the 
breast in the heat of a philosophical discussion, crying out, ‘No one else can 
have THIS pain’ ”— appears to make sense only if the referring term (“this”) 
remains mysteriously unspecifi ed, “an absolute demonstrative absolutely 
pointing to an absolute object.”  30  Absent such absolute connections, 
understanding happens, and it happens in a world whose actual mystery 
we overlook. To give the merest indication of Wittgenstein’s picture of 
that mystery:  understanding happens through the human ways or forms 
of life that we inhabit and fi nd ourselves attuned to, and that we also fi nd 
ourselves desiring (broadly speaking)— ways or forms of life into which we 
are inaugurated together with language, and that enable language to work 
on us and to move us (broadly speaking). 
 But Cavell’s epigram is explicitly characterizing music, not language. And 
it draws its inspiration from Benjamin, who had implied a contrast between 
music’s happier expressivity and that of (spoken) words, which are “affl icted 
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by meaning,” “meaning- laden speech” being “the reason for mournfulness.” 
Rather than a grief brought on by our words falling short of capturing our 
experience, Benjamin’s concern is with the grief and mourning that follows 
from speech itself. What we say, we must mean. And yet, what I do with 
my grief or mourning, my attitude toward words, is not spelled out in this 
extract from Benjamin’s text. 
 As I  read “Impressions of Revolution,” we should take “the achieving 
of understanding without meaning” to be as instructive of the workings 
of language as it is of music. What happens when we let go of the idea 
that the primary fact of communication is that words carry meanings 
(the ones found in a dictionary), or the idea— more to the point— that my 
understanding you rests on my associating your words with objects in the 
world, and similar feats of absolute translation? We might, in that case, 
rethink the following analogy, pitched by someone bearing a life with 
music: “Understanding a sentence is much more like understanding a theme 
in music than one might believe” (Wittgenstein’s words, quoted by Cavell in 
the penultimate paragraph of “Impressions of Revolution”).  31  Wittgenstein 
continues: “Why is just  this the pattern of variation in intensity and tempo 
[in a musical theme, or in its performance]? One would like to say: ‘Because 
I know what it all means.’ But what does it mean? I’d not be able to say.”  32  
The sense of Wittgenstein’s remark, and of Cavell’s interest in quoting it 
(he counts it among the “revolutionary” things Wittgenstein has to say 
about “the nature of our agreement in speech”),  33  is not to mark where 
the ineffable or unfathomable enter into our understanding of a musical 
theme or a sentence. The point is rather to underscore a fact of unending 
surprise, that “the impress produced in you by things as they pass and 
abiding in you when they have passed”  34   — that is, your attending, in just 
these surroundings, with whatever relation you bear to them, and with what 
has gone before, to just this tone and mood— is the necessary but suffi cient 
condition that structures our understanding (or our failing to understand) 
one another. — And so similarly, my capacity to mourn the passing of the 
world (as of time, or a friend and mentor, or the fact of meaning- laden 
speech itself) does not depend on something fi xed in speech or in the world 
to which I might still return, but is akin to my ability to follow a musical 
theme without losing the thread. 
 Notes 
 1  John T.  Scott , “ The Harmony between Rousseau’s Musical Theory and His 
Philosophy ,”  Journal of the History of Ideas , vol.  59 , no.  2,  1998 , 287. 
 2  Georges  Li é bert ,  Nietzsche and Music ( Chicago :  The University of Chicago 
Press ,  2004 ). 
9781501358180_pi-334.indd   195 09-Mar-20   08:07:33
INHERITING STANLEY CAVELL196
196
  3  M. O’C.  Drury , “ Conversations with Wittgenstein ,” in  Recollections of 
Wittgenstein , ed.  Rush  Rhees  ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  1984 ), 160. 
  4  Cf.  Stanley  Cavell ,  Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory 
( Stanford :  Stanford University Press ,  2010 ),  73– 5 , 183;  Andrea  Olmstead , 
 Conversations with Roger Sessions ( Boston :  Northeastern University Press , 
 1987 ),  107– 8 . 
  5  Cavell,  Little Did I Know , 172. 
  6  Ibid., 225; cf. 209. 
  7  Cavell doesn’t make explicit Thoreau’s “morning/ mourning” pun in his book 
on  Walden — the word “mourning” doesn’t appear there— but see  Stanley 
 Cavell ,  The Senses of Walden ( New York :  Viking Press ,  1972 ), especially 
 chapter 2, “Sentences,” where “morning” is paired with “moulting” (and 
“metamorphosis” and “leaving”);  In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of 
Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 
44– 5, 72– 3, 171– 2; and  This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after 
Emerson after Wittgenstein (Albuquerque: Living Batch Press, 1989), 83– 4; see 
also David LaRocca, “In the Place of Mourning: Questioning the Privations of 
the Private,”  Nineteenth- Century Prose , vol. 40, no. 2, 2013, 227– 42. 
  8  See my “A Soteriology of Reading: Cavell’s Excerpts from Memory,” in 
 Stanley Cavell: Philosophy, Literature and Criticism , ed.  James  Loxley and 
 Andrew  Taylor ( Manchester :  Manchester University Press ,  2011 ),  76– 91 ; 
 James  Conant , “ The Triumph of the Gift over the Curse in Stanley Cavell’s 
 Little Did I Know ,”  MLN , vol.  126,  2011 ,  1004– 13 ;  Timothy  Gould , “ Me, 
Myself and Us: Autobiography and Method in the Writing of Stanley Cavell ,” 
 Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies , vol.  1,  2013 ,  4– 18 ; and 
 Chiara  Alfano , “ A Scarred Tympanum ,”  Conversations , vol.  1,  2013 ,  19– 38 . 
  9  Cavell,  This New Yet Unapproachable America , 84. 
 10  Ibid. 
 11  Cavell,  Little Did I Know , 215. 
 12  Stanley  Cavell ,  “Music Discomposed” and “A Matter of Meaning It,” in  Must 
We Mean What We Say: A Book of Essays ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University 
Press ,  1969 ),  180– 237 . 
 13  I was by then well on my way to the better part of a lifetime of conversation 
with Cavell, and also with the remarkable cadre of graduate students studying 
with him in the mid- to late- 1980s at Harvard, a group he would later 
describe to me, and then in print, as “permanently inspiring” and “providing 
a continuity of intellectual purpose unmatched in my decades of teaching” 
(Cavell,  Little Did I Know , 476). 
 14  Cavell, “Music Discomposed,” 192– 3. 
 15  James  Conant , “ Throwing Away the Top of the Ladder ,”  The Yale Review , 
vol.  79, Spring  1990 ,  328– 64 , 329; see also “Must We Show What We Cannot 
Say?,” in  The Senses of Stanley Cavell , ed. Richard Fleming and Michael Payne 
(Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1989), 242– 83. 
 16  Cavell, “Music Discomposed,” 192. 
9781501358180_pi-334.indd   196 09-Mar-20   08:07:33
WORDS FAIL ME. 197
197
 17  Experiences of sudden (visual or auditory) recognition are the explicit topic of 
Wittgenstein’s late remarks on aspect- seeing, remarks that fi gure prominently 
in Part 4of Cavell’s  The Claim of Reason and that he returned to late in his 
career. See Stanley Cavell,  The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, 
Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 354ff.; and 
his “The Touch of Words,” in  Seeing Wittgenstein Anew , ed. William Day and 
Victor J. Krebs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 81– 98. 
 18  Ibid., 193. 
 19  Cf. Ludwig  Wittgenstein ,  Philosophical Investigations , trans.  G. 
E. M.  Anscombe ,  P. M. S.  Hacker , and  Joachim  Schulte , rev. 4th ed. 
( Chichester :  Wiley- Blackwell ,  2009 ), §610, §78. 
 20  “Nearly everybody can recognize a surly look or the smell of tar, but few can 
describe them non- committally, i.e. otherwise than as ‘surly’ or ‘of tar.’ ” J. L. 
Austin, “Other Minds,” in  Philosophical Papers , 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 85. 
 21  Cavell,  Little Did I Know , 53. 
 22  Ibid. 
 23  Ibid., 21– 3. Stanley’s contribution to the review was a piano piece entitled 
“Indian Drums,” which our autobiographer says, “I can still play fl awlessly on 
demand,” thereby making a rare and explicit gag out of the truth. 
 24  Ibid., 77. 
 25  Wittgenstein,  Philosophical Investigations , §217. 
 26  Cavell,  Little Did I Know , 4. 
 27  Stanley Cavell, “Impressions of Revolution,”  The Musical Quarterly 85, no. 2, 
2001, 264– 73. 
 28  Walter Benjamin,  The Origin of German Tragic Drama , trans. John Osborne 
(London: NLB, 1977), 209, 211; quoted both more and less extensively by 
Cavell in “Impressions of Revolution,” 270. 
 29  Cavell, “Impressions of Revolution,” 270. 
 30  Stanley Cavell, “The Wittgensteinian Event,” in  Reading Cavell , ed. Alice 
Crary and Sanford Shieh (London: Routledge, 2006), 11. 
 31  Wittgenstein,  Philosophical Investigations , §527, as quoted by Cavell, 
“Impressions of Revolution,” 272. (The translation in the revised fourth 
edition of  Investigations reads: “Understanding a sentence in language is much 
more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think.”) 
 32  Ibid. For the later Wittgenstein’s conception of language as revealed 
through the lens of his life with music, see my “The Aesthetic Dimension of 
Wittgenstein’s Later Writings,” in  Wittgenstein on Aesthetic Understanding , ed. 
Garry L. Hagberg (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 3– 29. 
 33  Cavell, “Impressions of Revolution,” 272. 
 34  Augustine,  Confessions , trans. F. J. Sheed, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2006), 253 ( Conf . XI, xxvii). 
9781501358180_pi-334.indd   197 09-Mar-20   08:07:33
198
9781501358180_pi-334.indd   198 09-Mar-20   08:07:33
